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Life before matter, possibLe 
signification before tangibLe signs: 
toward a mediating View
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AbstrAct: Life is a creative response to creative nature. this notion heeds norm Hirst’s call, 
by way of robert rosen, that life as creativity follows a ‘logic’ that is radically distinct from 
classical logical principles. this alternate ‘logic’ of creative life follows differentiating identity 
and included-middle principles. charles s. peirce’s process philosophy and his concept of the 
sign, offer a sense of the nonlinear, nonmechanistic, creative emergence of signs and life through 
possibly possible signification and living forms as illustrated by means of amorphous topological 
variability.
Keywords: included-middle, interdependence, interaction, interrelatedness, incompleteness, 
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[w]e can see parallels between chaos and emergent properties. both involve 
unpredictability, though arising from different sources. with chaos, it is 
sensitivity to initial conditions that makes the dynamics unpredictable. with 
emergent properties, it is the general inability of observers to predict the behavior 
of nonlinear systems from an understanding of their parts and interactions. 
ricard solé and brian goodwin (2000: 20)
into tHe semiosic sea from wHence eVentUaLLy organisms 
emerged
nobel laureate phillip anderson published a paper in 1972 with the title: ‘more is 
different’. He writes that physics has had astounding success in classifying and describing 
the fundamental particles, in quantifying and qualifying their behavior and interactions. 
but toss a few trillion atoms together, and it’s an entirely different story.
that’s why it is becoming increasingly acceptable for chemistry and biology and 
psychology and the rest of the social sciences to go their own ways. they are no longer 
inextricably tied to the queen of sciences, physics, which bears, in reductionistic terms, 
the less exact sciences. in recent years this idea has become especially prevalent among 
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those who probe the mysteries of the human mind and the brain. they constantly run 
up against the unexpected, leading them to believe that the brain is ‘wetter’ than mere 
computer-like hard-wired circuitry; that it is less reliable than mere chemical reactions; 
and that it is less predictable than psychology and cognitive explanatory principles 
have had it. investigators the likes of oliver sacks (1995), V. s. ramachandran, sandra 
blakeslee (1998), and antonio damasio (1994, 1999) have made us painfully aware of 
this. interaction among human and human, and human and nonhuman biological 
organisms, interaction between specialized organs within relatively complex organisms, 
and interaction regarding molecules within living organisms, cannot simply be reduced 
to organic chemistry. for, from organic chemistry to physical chemistry to physics, there 
is a gap that apparently cannot be effectively closed. it has taken science a few hundred 
years to come to terms with this irreducibility.
robert rosen tells us that to the question ‘what is life?’, the tired response, which 
has been ‘it is a machine’, should now be defunct. but it isn’t. for, generations of success 
has entrenched the machine metaphor in the minds of scientists and laypeople alike 
such that to question it became well-nigh unthinkable. norm Hirst refuses to buy into 
the metaphor, however, quoting rosen’s suggestion that the ‘machine metaphor is not 
just a little bit wrong; it is entirely wrong and must be discarded’. (1991:23). as a more 
appropriate response, Hirst (2008: 8) calls for ‘new philosophy’ that revives that other 
side of the western tradition, ‘organicist philosopy’ as a counterpart to the perennially 
dominant philosophy, ‘substance philosophy’. this ‘new philosophy’ will be a ‘philosophy 
of organisms’, and it will entail ‘a new logic’.
the initial premises underlying his project are:  (1) the cosmos is a living organism, (2) 
life is creativity, (3) life precedes, and it is the energy providing for the possibility of, matter, 
(4) life itself is a question of uncertainty, of the unexpected, (5) life is the ability for self-
organization, that is, self-creation, and (6) creativity is based on value—which, i suppose, is 
before the creative act unspecifiable.
At the core of  the problem
the hoary dream of pierre simon de Laplace, nineteenth-century french 
mathematician, had it that the entire universe could be reduced to interaction between 
fundamental particles—as they were conceived in the classical newtonian sense, of 
course. in today’s terms this means that, first, the position and momentum of each 
and every atom and molecule must be specified and programmed into a sufficiently 
powerful computer, and then, by the classical laws of physics, the computer will be able 
to specify the state of those atoms and molecules at this instant, back into the receding 
past, and into the infinitely receding horizon.
atoms and molecules are in this regard nothing more than blindly moving about 
according to cause and effect principles. and if this is the case at the atomic and 
molecular levels, so also it is the case of all levels up to and including living organisms 
and collections of living organisms. However, more atoms and molecules is by no means 
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simply more of the same. indeed, as anderson puts it: ‘more is different’. which is to say 
that increasingly complex levels abide by their own principles, have their own modes 
of behavior, and interact in exceedingly different ways following different rules and 
strategies. taking ‘more’ into consideration creates, in the words of gregory bateson 
(1972), difference, and differences that make a difference. Difference, according to bateson, 
gives rise to meaning, and meaning isn’t possible if there is no more than ‘more of the 
same’, redundantly speaking. ‘more’ must imply spontaneous emergence, novelty, creation, and 
ultimately, life, differentially speaking.
proliferation of differences that make differences is another way of saying process, 
i would suggest. it is another way of saying that process is the incessant becoming of 
being but that being is never being as a final product, for its beingness is always in the process 
of becoming. it is to say that everything is always becoming something other than what 
it was becoming. this flies against what usually—though not always—goes as logic 
and mathematics, in today’s parlance. Hirst, in this vein, writes that: ‘Logic, as known 
today, is thoroughly extensional. it is shocking to realize extensional means form, syntax, 
but without meaning. Likewise, mathematics is extensional. Life requires logic with 
meaning, i.e., intentional logic’ (2008: 10).
Hirst goes on to suggest that life evolves along circuitous nonlinear, historical paths. 
it cannot do otherwise, for life is process, not product; it is always becoming, it never is. 
in contrast, logicians and mathematicians up to, and in many cases beyond the first 
few decades of the twentieth century, followed the sugar-plum dream of consistency and 
completeness, and the grand unified theory (gUt), the theory of  everything (toe).
Our limitations should by now be obvious
Kurt gödel’s proof published in 1931, among other ‘limitative theorems’ (deLong 
1970), should have convinced mathematicians and logicians, and physicists and other 
scientists as well, that we might as well forget about attaining consistency and completeness 
once and for all. and, if i’m not mistaken, it seems that an increasing number of physical 
scientists have been conceding that gUt and toe are impossible dreams.
this is to say that absolute, timeless truth is out of bounds, for the game of life, 
like any and all other games—including wittgenstein’s (1953) languages games—is 
never fixed, but rather, novel strategies are always emerging, and rules are periodically 
changed in order to accommodate them to their respective games. indeed, this would 
seem to call for something other than the classical logical principles of Identity, Non-
Contradiction, and Excluded-Middle. nothing is permanently identical to itself if it is always 
becoming something other than that which it was becoming. if it is always becoming, 
then its very becoming renders it other than, and contradictory with respect to, what it 
was. and if it is always becoming, from whence can this becoming begin its becoming? 
by means of discarding the excluded-middle, no doubt. this would seem to imply a 
‘logic’ of Differentiating Identity within what we might call the Included-Middle, since being 
is always becoming regarding the becomingness of being, such that what was becoming 
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is always merging with what is becoming.
with this in mind, i wish to suggest that if the possibility of  life is before matter, and 
if—as i have argued elsewhere (merrell 2008)—possibly possible signification is before actual 
signs, then there is more than we would like to think regarding the issue of both matter 
and our signs. i take signs into due consideration, for solely by means of our signs: (1) can 
we (think we) know our signs in actual everyday practices, (2) can we (think we) know 
matter, which makes up our world as we (think we) know it, and (3) can we (think we) 
know the world of our imaginary musings, which is the source of our creative use of signs. 
from this perspective, i will attempt further to qualify, and elucidate, Hirst’s project by: 
(1) attending to the notions of the possibility of  life and possibly possible signification, and (2) 
implementing the thrust of Hirst’s call for a renewed sense of ‘philosophy’ and ‘logic’ 
that is more in tune with life and process in the creation of (3) a concept, and a ‘logic’, of 
‘pre-matter’ and ‘pre-signification’, and the role they play in life, and the life of our signs.
in doing so, i take up charles sanders peirce’s triadic concept of the sign for the 
purpose of illustrating how signs emerging and life emerging are complementary, which 
is to say that: (1) there cannot be the one without the other, (2) they are interdependent, 
interactive, and interrelated, and (3) together, the two processes are co-participatory.
peirce’s triadomania
before there are signs, there is pure possibility; that is, the range of all possible possibilities. 
then signs begin emerging, according to peirce’s three categories of signs, and of 
imagination, thought, and the physical world, namely: firstness, secondness and 
thirdness.
briefly, firstness—comparable to iconicity, as we 
shall note shortly—is what it is, without any relationship 
whatsoever with any other. it is self-contained, self-
reflexive, and self-sufficient; it is a feeling, before there 
is conscious awareness of what the feeling is a feeling 
of—some other.1 secondness—in the manner of 
indexicality—is what it is, insofar as it enters into 
interrelationship with some other, the other of the feeling. 
secondness entails interaction with the other in the 
sense of something here and something else there, the 
first something possibly acting as a sign and the second 
something acting as the object of the sign. thirdness—basically of the nature of 
symbolicity—is what it is, in the respect that it brings firstness and secondness together 
by mediating them, and at the same time it brings itself into interaction with them in the 
     1. sandra rosenthal (2001) considers firstness ‘the most neglected of his categories’ due to the fact that it 
is elusive, vague, considered relatively unimportant with respect to the other categories, and also because of 
its characterization as ‘inherently inconsistent’. as i suggest below, while firstness is ‘inconsistent’ through 
and through, that is no problem from within the sphere of firstness, since ‘inconsistency’ is of the very 
nature of firstness as self-contained, self-reflexive and self-sufficient.
Figure 1
Firstness
Secondness Thirdness
The categories modeled
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same way they are brought into interaction with each other (CP 2.227-390).
we have the categories depicting their interdependent, interactive interrelatedness in figure 
1.2 notice how they are ‘democratic’, since each one is interrelated with the other two in 
the same way they are interrelated with each other. notice that the model is not 
‘triangular’, but rather, there are three lines meeting at a point in the form of a ‘tripod’ 
such that there cannot be merely a binary relation between one category and another, 
for the interrelations between any two categories are possible solely by means of 
interrelations between all three categories. notice also that the swirling lines illustrating 
the processual character of these interrelations essentially make up a ‘borromean knot’ 
(the dotted lines). the borromean knot exercises a move, from the two-dimensional 
sheet toward three-dimensionality, with the overlapping lines. this is significant, i would 
submit. for, the three lines making up the categorical interrelations are not simply two-
dimensional. they are more properly conceived as a ‘tripod’ as seen from either above 
or below, that, as a result of the swiveling lines of the borromean knot, oscillates forward 
and backward as the lines swirl and gyrate. thus the three-dimensionality of ‘semiotic 
space’, which, along with a temporal dimension, makes up a nonlinear timespace 
manifold (merrell 2005).
if we place peirce’s tripartite components making 
up the sign in their appropriate diagrammatical form, 
we will have a ‘tripod’ as depicted in figure 2. the 
representamen—otherwise dubbed a ‘sign’ in common 
parlance—is self-contained unless and until it comes 
into interdependent interaction and interrelation with its 
respective semiotic object—the object with which it 
interacts. and the interpretant—a composite of the sign’s 
‘interpretation’ and ‘meaning’ developed through 
interdependent, interrelated interaction between that sign 
and some interpreter—mediates the representamen and 
semiotic object in the same way that it mediates between 
itself and them.
moreover, if we qualify peirce’s basic trio of sign 
types—icons, indices and symbols—according to their 
proper place in the ‘tripod’, we will have the same 
‘tripod’, as depicted in figure 3. Icons, indices and symbols 
make up peirce’s most basic sign types. Icons, in their 
purest form, are what they are, without having yet 
come into interrelation with anything else. Indices are 
what they are in the sense that they have come into 
     2. i use the italicized terms ‘interdependent’, ‘interactive’, and ‘interrelated’, though they are not exactly 
peircean in origin. nevertheless, as i have argued in detail elsewhere, citing derivation of these terms in 
buddhist philosophy and quantum theory, i believe they effectively portray the spirit of peirce regarding 
his general concept of semiosis (see merrell 2000, 2002, 2003).
Figure 2
Representamen
Semiotic
object
Interpretant
The sign modeled
Figure 3
Iconicity
Indexicality Symbolicity
Basic sign types modeled
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interrelation with some other Symbols are what they are as a result of mediating and 
bringing icons and indices into interrelation with each other in the same way they, those 
selfsame symbols, bring themselves into interrelation with those icons and indices.
icons, or images, whether of sight, sound, taste, touch, smell, or kinesthetic or somatic 
feelings and sensations, are the flesh of linguistic signs. and indices are the bones that 
give substance to those linguistic signs. they link images to their respective others by 
means of natural connections of similarity, contiguity, part-whole, container-contained, 
and cause-effect interrelations, which provide the necessary association between signs 
of mind or the world and mental images and physical world images (in this regard, see 
the work of george Lakoff and mark Johnson 1980, 1999, Johnson 1987, Lakoff 1987).
Toward a sense of  ‘Pre-Firstness’3
well, thus far i haven’t given as much as an inkling of a hint regarding what i 
promised: a ‘logic’ of possibly possible signification and the possibility of  life. the next bend in 
the stream calls for figure 4, of the same triadic, processual make up as figures 1-3. 
consider figure 4 as ‘pre-signification’, or ‘pre-life’, if you 
will, in the most basic sense, the pure possibility of  
possibilities, before anything concretely and specifically 
of semiotic nature has emerged. in other words, it is 
semiosis in its most pristine form. if at its roots a possible 
icon resembles something or other, a positivity, and if that 
which indicates the icon, a possible index, is not what 
the icon is, a negativity, then let us provisionally call 
them ‘+’ and ‘–’ (the following discussion draws from 
the work of rosenthal 1994, 2000; see also merrell 1998, 
2000, 2003, 2007).
Let ‘+’ function as positive possible possibility, the possibility of signs that might emerge at 
a given moment. Let ‘–’ function as negative possible possibility, what has become at a given 
moment the sign’s object, which implies what the vast majority of those positive possibilities 
are not. Let ‘Ψ’ function as mediating possible possibility; like a possible symbol, it mediates 
‘+’ and ‘–’, and it mediates itself and them, which serves to keep open the possibility 
of other positive possible possibilities being selected at some other timespace juncture. 
these possibilities of a sign emerge out of ‘emptiness’, ‘no-thingness’, or, mathematically 
speaking, zero. in mathematics, zero is commonly construed as ‘nothing’. but it does 
not merely imply something that is somehow nothing. Zero originally comes from india: 
Hindu thought and later buddhism. ‘emptiness’, as the word is used in mahayana 
buddhism, is in a paradoxical manner of speaking absolutely empty of  all emptiness. even to 
say ‘emptiness is emptiness’ is to say ‘something’, which is not what ‘emptiness’ is; hence 
to say what ‘emptiness’ is, is to say what it is not. ‘emptiness’, like zero, is the possibility 
     3. eugen baer (1988) uses the term, ‘pre-firstness’, appropriately i believe, for what i have alluded to with 
a complementary term, ‘emptiness’.
0
O
+
- �  
Figure 4
Prefiguring the sign
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for the emergence of everything—all objects, acts, and events regarding ‘emptiness’, all 
integers regarding zero. as we read in the dao, from zero or emptiness, one emerges; 
one subdivides into two; two becomes three; and three becomes many.4
as a sign emerges out of ‘emptiness’ or zero, it enters into the range of concrete 
possibilities, depending on the sign maker and taker and the timespace context. this is 
far removed from pure ‘emptiness’. it is like proceeding from zero, ‘0’, to the ‘empty set’, 
‘∅’. Zero is just zero. the empty set, in contrast, is something that happens to be empty. 
it is the ‘noticed absence’ of something that was, could have been, or might possibly be 
there partially or wholly to fill the unoccupied space. so we have ‘pure emptiness’ (‘0’, 
or the sphere of all possible possibilities), the ‘noticed absence’ of somethingness (‘∅’), and 
the pluses and the minuses of figure 4.
dimensions closed open pre-firstness categories
4-d Hypersolid (hole in the Klein-bottle →)
Ψ →… → 
… 0
(neither-nor)
3-d solid Klein-bottle ± → Ψ thirdness
2-d plane möbius-band √• → ±(either/or) secondness
1-d Line figure ‘8’ ∅ → √• firstness
0-d point possible possibilities 0 → ∅(both-and)
Table 1: Topologizing the process
The central portion of Figure 4, ‘√•’, recalls the square root of minus one. This 
mathematical sign, ‘√–1’, is commonly replaced in equations and proofs by ‘i’—
comparable to ‘Ψ’ in figure 4. Like zero, the sign has no value, either positive or 
negative. it just is what it is. it has no direct re-presentation in the physical world; yet it 
is used in equations in relativity theory, quantum mechanics, engineering problems, and 
computation. it was considered an embarrassment in mathematics for centuries after its 
discovery. why? because it is anomalous. its answer is found in neither ‘+1’ nor ‘–1’. yet, 
paradoxically, its answer is in both of them, and it is in neither of them. by a comparable 
token, the role of the interpretant, like ‘Ψ’, as mediator and moderator, is neither positive 
nor negative and at the same time it is both positive and negative.
this is to say that what is, in the positive sense, is related to what is not, in the 
negative sense, though under other circumstances, is not could have been is, and is could 
have been is not. thus positivity and the negativity enter into an undecidably oscillating 
‘+/–/+/–/+/–/+/–/ … n’, at the core of the tripod where ‘√’ is found. it is neither 
positive nor negative and at the same time it is both positive and negative. around the 
     4. for general reading along the lines of the topics alludes to in this paragraph, see cheng 1986, chi 1974, 
dantzig 1930, Lao tsu 1967, rotman 1987, seife 2000.
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timeless ‘√’, where there is neither arrest nor movement, ‘+’, ‘–’, and ‘Ψ’ gyrate. thus 
we have the interactive ‘0 → ∅ → √• → + → – → Ψ’, as the pure possibility of a possible 
sign, a sign that from this point can begin its emergence into the stream of semiosis, of 
signs becoming signs. thus figure 4 is actually antecedent to figures 1, 2 and 3 as far as 
the process of a sign becoming a sign goes.
so much for ‘pre-firstness’, that is, the possibility of a sign. allow me now to attempt 
illustrating the signifying process with respect to temporality and spatiality.
from a topoLogicaL point of View
Just as a point, by multiplying itself an infinite 
number of times in linear succession, can become (can 
be generated into) a line, so also a line can become a 
plane, a plane a solid, and a solid a hypersolid. in other 
words, it is a matter of zero-dimensionality becoming 
one-dimensionality, one becoming two, two becoming 
three, and three becoming four-dimensionality. the 
first column of table 1 offers the progression, from zero 
dimensionality—the sphere of possible possibilities, the 
progression from ‘0 →→ Ø’, to 1-d, and up to 4-d.
this concept of dimensionalities in terms of whole integers is relatively closed, as 
suggested in the second column of table 1. fractal geometry, in contrast, creates the 
possibility of an infinite number of fractional dimensionalities. another illustration of 
the fading in and out of whole number dimensionalities in fractal geometry is suggested 
in the third column. for example, if we take a point, extend it to a line, stretch the 
line out and fold it back such that it intersects with itself and connects its ending to its 
beginning we have a ‘figure 8’, or, if in the laid back position it is the symbol for infinity, 
‘∞’. the intersection indicates the point at which the line is of double-point—yet still 
infinitesimal—‘thinness’, representing its very tentatively easing into the next dimension. 
either that, or it tunnels its way through itself. from within a 1-d world inhabited by 
Linelanders, the ‘tunneling’ effect is the only way, but from a flatlander’s 2-d world it is 
easy to see how the line could fold back over on top of itself.
Moving to the next level
a ‘möbius-band’ is a 2-d rendition of the ‘figure 8’ (see figure 5). a 2-d flatlander 
on a möbius-band could not be aware of the ‘twist’ in her world that is necessary in 
order to create the band, for that twist could not be made except by extension into 3-d 
space, which is unavailable to the flatlander.
However, from our 3-d vantage point, it is plain to see that the möbius-band is 
‘twisted’, and that whereas previously there was a front side and a back side to the 
two-dimensional strip, now, since the strips has been given a 180 degree twist and it 
Figure 5
Möbius strip
fLoyd merreLL 107
has connected its front end to its back end, there is no inside or outside. but we can 
easily impose our bivalent thinking on the möbius-band continuum, thus mutilating it 
to create an ‘inside/outside’ discontinuity. this is, metaphorically speaking, part and 
parcel of our ordinary dualistic way of thinking.
From the zero degree
a point (0-d), or the sphere of all possible possibilities illustrated by ‘pre-firstness or the 
fourth column of table 1, contains anything and everything, past, present and future. 
from the possible possibility of signs, we create what we (think we) know with respect to: 
(1) our signs in use during our everyday coming and going, (2) our world, and (3) our 
creative acts themselves.
in this regard, an atom can be conceived as a minuscule solid, indivisible sphere, or 
made up of largely vacuous space—or something else. space can be either euclidean or 
riemannian—or something else. time and space, or matter and energy, can either be 
maintained in separation or unified. the earth can be the center of the Universe or it 
can be the sun—or something else. these are all contradictions; they are inconsistent 
and often mutually exclusive; yet at some time in human history, they have been seriously 
and soberly entertained as the way the world is. within the sphere of all possible possibilities, 
both one view and another one can become taken for granted within some timespace 
context or other within some culture or other. our dualistic thinking, in contrast, 
demands either one view or another, and there is no alternative. in other words, our 
dualistic thinking holds tight to the principles of identity, non-contradiction and 
excluded-middle.
However, table 1 reveals dualism residing within 2-d space. but we inhabit 3-d 
space. this is ‘Klein-bottle’ space.
And to the level of  our own 3-D world
a Klein-bottle (figure 6) can be made by joining 
two möbius-bands, one with a left-hand twist and the 
other with a right-hand or mirror-image twist. Like 
the möbius-band, the Klein-bottle is locally of two 
dimensions, a smooth, continuous contour. from a 
perspective limited to the surface of the bottle, every 
local area might appear to follow euclidean principles 
of 2-d geometry, as if it existed on a cartesian plane 
with 2-d figures sketched on a sheet of paper. However, 
appearances are deceptive, once again. Like the world 
of a two-dimensional being, a flatlander on a möbius-
band, we spherelanders inhabit the surface of the 
Klein-bottle, which follows curved-space riemannian 
rather than euclidean geometry.
Klein-bottle
Figure 6
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a Klein-bottle might be described as a 2-d manifold, with inside and outside, and 
a break or cut at some point where inside becomes outside, and vice versa. However, 
the Klein-bottle becomes a visual paradox when viewed within 3-d space, just as the 
möbius-band is a visual paradox if a flatlander tried to view it ‘riemannianly’ rather 
than ‘euclideanly’ from within her 2-d space. for, just as the möbius-band can only 
exist in 3-d space, so also the Klein-bottle can only exist in 4-d space. in other words, 
our ‘figure 8’ is a 1-d object twisted in 2-d space and projected on a 2-d plane, a 
möbius-band is a 2-d object twisted in 3-d space and projected on a 2-d plane, and the 
Klein-bottle is a 3-d object with a discontinuous ‘break’ that is impossible outside 4-d 
space. that is, a Klein-bottle can’t be embedded in three dimensions, just as a möbius-
band can’t be embedded in two dimensions and a figure eight can’t be embedded in one 
dimension. Let me try to explain this better.
compare figure 6 to a corked bottle of wine. it has an inside and an outside, and 
you can’t get from one to the other except by removing the cork. once uncorked, 
the bottle has an opening and a circle or a lip as what we might take to be a line 
of demarcation between inside and outside. notice that the form in figure 6 doesn’t 
have a circle and a line of demarcation as does the wine bottle. the Klein-bottle can’t 
be depicted in 3-d space without the existence of a ‘rupture’, a ‘hole’, at which point 
creating the transformation from ‘inside’ to ‘outside’. what is the implication of this? a 
flatlander can glide along her möbius-band world around and around, on a continuous 
superhighway as far as she’s concerned. if her world consisted of the wine bottle, she 
could do the same, passing from inside to outside and back again, as carefree as can be, 
all the while willing and able to bear testimony regarding the continuity of her world, a 
complete and consistent world of two dimensions, for how could it possibly be anything 
other than two dimensions? of course the Klein-bottle in figure 6 has a hole, as does 
the wine bottle. but the similarity ends there. the Klein-bottle’s ‘hole’, unlike that of the 
wine bottle, cannot exist in 3-d space.
why not? Let us go back to the möbius-band in search of an answer.
Is it all a cosmic knot?
notice that a flatlander could conveniently pass through what we see as a point 
of discontinuity while unaware that her world consisted of a twist, at precisely that 
arbitrary point, within 3-d space. notice also that an imaginary fly buzzing around in 
the 3-d space of the Klein-bottle could pass through the neck and into the large portion 
of the bottle, and then into the neck and once again into the larger space and outside, 
oblivious in regard to the fact that at the extremity of the neck there is a discontinuity 
that mars the continuity of the 2-d surface. Like the fly, we live within 3-d space; and 
like the fly, if our entire world consisted of 3-d space within a Klein-bottle, we could 
pass through the ‘hole’ without realizing there is a ‘hole’ at all.
in other words, we are as limited to our 3-d space just as the flatlander is limited to 
her 2-d space. and comparable to the flatlander’s world within which she believes she 
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travels along a continuous pathway unimpeded, as far as we are concerned our travels 
in 3-d space are for practical purposes continuous. in other words, she is unaware of 
the ‘break’ in her 2-d world, and we are unaware of the ‘hole’ in our 3-d world. in both 
cases, moving into 3-d and 4-d respectively, the discontinuity makes itself known.
syntHesiZing
‘what is the gist of all this palaver?’—you are by now surely thinking. that the 
third column of table 1, implying openness, is an ongoing metaphor, a conceit if you 
will, of our world, beginning with possible possibilities and ‘opening out’ to the ongoing 
transitoriness available to us through the Klein-bottle ‘hole’.
This is the swiveling, swirling trajectory: ‘0 → Ø → √• → ± → Y’. But it doesn’t 
end there. it continues on: ‘y →… →… 0’ (column 4 of table 1). Like the ‘figure 8’, 
the möbius-band, and the Klein-bottle, what goes around comes around. the ending 
meets the beginning. this is to say that, within the 4-d timespace manifold, nothing is 
absolutely in the most absolute sense either the one thing or the other, but our bivalent, 
dualistic thinking can usually manage to make it so. However, what we actually have 
in the 4-d manifold is the promise that neither the one sign nor the other, neither the one 
interpretation nor the other, neither one moment in life nor the other, simply is what it is. 
rather, everything is always becoming something other than what it was becoming.
in this manner, at the lower level of table 1 where both-and play havoc with the 
presumably hard-rock principle of non-contradiction, contradictions and inconsistencies 
pervade, and without undue stress, giving rise to the enigmas and paradoxes of our 
world and our thought. Here, overdetermination allows for undeterminate possibilities to 
have their 15 minutes of fame as the best possible accounts of our world, our imagination, 
and our thought, within some timespace context or other. at the middle level, we try 
our level headed best to hammer our world and our thought into clear and distinct 
eithers and ors. this is the level of (hopeful) determinate knowing. at the upper level, the 
transitory nature of our world and our thought should become apparent, that is, if we 
are not helplessly and hopelessly entrenched in our mechanistic thinking. Here, novel 
possibilities can emerge, from the Included-Middle that is always there, whether we know 
it or not and whether we like it or not. thus this level does a slam dunk on the hallowed 
principle of excluded-middle. and this level cannot but remain incomplete, regarding our 
knowing our world, our imagination, and our thoughts, since we, finite and fallible as 
we are, like the spherelander inhabiting the surface of the Klein-bottle, is incapable of 
seeing it all in one fell swoop.
However, since new knowing can always be, and usually is, in the process of 
emerging, underdetermination allows us, as individuals and as human communities in 
constant dialogue, to know anew, from within slightly different to radically distinct 
imaginary constructs, frames of reference, and perspectives, and from within perpetually 
differentiating timespace constructs. whatever happens to have become our knowing, 
will always be able to put a few band-aids here and there, slap some appendages 
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somewhere else, or throw it all in the trash and begin anew. our knowing is always in 
the process of undergoing ‘normal evolutionary’ change, and when that is no longer 
sufficient, ‘revolutionary’ transformations can occur (Kuhn 1970, feyerabend 1982). for 
we, like our signs, like life itself, are always becoming something other than what we were 
becoming.
A final word
Hirst writes that ‘life, being creative energy, is basically free. However, when and 
where it gets bogged down and develops habitual patterns, it is not free; and only then 
when freedom is lost, can it be understood by logical concepts, theoretical physics, 
mathematics, and the hard sciences’ (2008: 16).
i would suggest that table 1, taking signs rather than life into consideration, offers 
the notion of creative freedom at the lower and upper levels, while the middle level 
gives an idea of ‘when and where’ creative freedom ‘gets bogged down and develops 
habitual patterns’. Habitual patterns, however, are part of life, and they are necessary 
for imagination, thought, and communication; thus it would appear that signs of life 
share certain properties with the life of signs. and language, supreme symbolic signs, 
whether mathematical, logical, or natural, could not function without our living habitual 
patterns of distinguishing and cutting and mutilating and categorizing our world and our 
thought: indeed, the classical principles of identity, non-contradiction, and excluded-
middle are in this regard more of a boon than a bane. but there must be more, much 
more, and it is suggested by the lower and upper levels of table 1, especially when and 
where they meet and merge, for that is where the fountain head of creativity lies.
 in fact, i would go a step further, suggesting that, at the most primitive 
level, figure 2 in conjunction with table 1, from possible possibilities to the possibility 
of a concrete sign—or life as it were—offers us a notion of Hirst’s ‘characteristics of 
organismic functioning’ (2008: 15). that is to say, in somewhat different terms than 
Hirst’s, figure 2 and table 1 imply and include the creation of: (1) novelty, (2) variety, 
(3) paradox (including inconsistency), (4) collaborative, collective self-organization 
through interdependence, interrelationality and interaction, (5) meta-stability due to 
ongoing desequilibration, (6) development and evolution, (7) oscillating, scintillating, 
uncertain undulating processual change, and (8) some final cause, that always remains 
underdetermined (and incomplete), given our finite fallible nature.
the properties of organisms, their development and health, the dynamic 
activities of brains and communities, the characteristic order of ecosystems, 
the patterns of evolutionary change, are processes in which we are directly 
involved. for better or for worse, we participate in them, and of course, we 
would wish to participate wisely rather than irresponsibly.ricard solé and 
brian goodwin (2000: 28)
floyd merrell 
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